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STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is an appeal from a conviction of passing and 
uttering a fictitious check. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Defendant was found guilty and convicted of pass-
ing an uttering a fictitious check by unanimous verdict 
of seven jurors; Defendant was sentenced to indeter-
minate term at the Utah State Prison. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant-Appellant was tried on l\farch 27, 19G!l 
in \Velwr County for tlw charge of passing and uttering 
a fictitious check. 
During the course of the trial, the JH'OS<·cution intro-
duced evidence that tlw Defendant, at various tiuws not 
rPlevant to the facts in this case, had used an alias; the 
name Richard Feeney. (R. 39043) 
During the noon recess of the trial, one of the jurors 
hPcame ill; it was stipulatPd that said juror could be 
excm;ed; and that the remaining seven jurors could ren-
der a verdict in the case. (R. 61) 
The seven jurors returned a unanimous verdict of 
guilty. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
On appeal Defendant-Appellant checks reversal of 
the jurisdiction and remand for a new trial. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
INTRODUCTION INTO EVIDENCE THAT DE-
FENDANT HAD USED AN ALIAS WAS PREJU-
DICIAL ERROR WHEN THE DEFENDANT'S USE 
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OF THE SAID ALIAS WAS NOT RE LEV ANT OR 
MATERIAL TO THE ISSUES TO BE TRIED BY 
THE JURY. 
In the present case, the Defendant was charged with 
uttering and passing a fictitious check. At no time was 
there any question that the Defendant had not used his 
own name, Harold Reemer, throughout the transactions 
on which the charge was based. The prosecution in its 
case in chief, called, as a witness, an officer from the 
State Drivers License: Division to testify that the De-
fendant, Mr. Reemer, had used the name Richard Feeney 
in applying for a Utah Drivers License. The substance 
of said testimony was: 
Q. Would you state your full name for us T 
A. Ernest F. Kyriopoulos. 
Q. And where are you 
A. I am employed at the Department of Public 
Safety, Drivers License Division. 
Q. What generally arc the duties involved T 
A. I have custody of the records .... 
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Q. I see. Now, Mr. Kyriopoulos, did you receive 
a request from our office to investigate the 
driving record of a gentleman by the name 
of Harold Reemer and also Richard Feeney? 
A. I had a request from the District Attorney. 
l\IR. R I C H A R D S : (interposing) Your 
Honor, at this time I would object to the line of 
questioning upon thl• grounds that it's immaterial, 
and the question involved in this trial here today 
is whether or not there is an Ethel Norris and 
whether or not this is a false and fictitious check. 
It matters not whether l\Ir. Reemer has a 
driver's license under another name than Mr. 
Harold Reemer. 
I don't see how it makes any differencr. 
\Ve're willing to admit or stipulate that Mr. 
Reemer has also used the name of Mr. Richard 
Fel'ney, but I don't know how it plays a role in 
the trial today. 
THE COURT: Did you say Richard? 
l\IR. RICHARDS: Richard. 
THE COURT: Richard Feeney' 
l\IR. RICHARDS: Yes. 
THE COPRT: Do you stipulate that he 
also nsed the name of Richard Feeney? 
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MR. RICHARDS: Yes, we do. But I think 
it's immaterial and I don't see why we need to be 
delayed -
THE COURT: (interposing) Well, what did 
you want to 
MR. SHARP: We intend, Your Honor, to tie 
this is specifically to the action involved. 
THE COURT: Well, you want the sti pula-
MR. SHARP : What I want in evidence is a 
copy of the driving record - not the driving 
record, but the application and the photograph 
identifying him along with the number attached 
to the driver's license, Your Honor. We intend 
to use it in a later identification. 
THE COURT: Well, you mean identification 
of the 
MR. SHARP: Identification of the defendant 
with another transaction which ties in with the 
present one. 
I think it might be appropriate, Your Honor, 
at this time, rather than go into a lot of detail, 
maybe we'd better excuse the jury. 
THE COURT: Well, I think I'll overrule the 
objection. Go ahead p;oceed it - what 
it amounts to. I'll see if its material later. 
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At this point the witness testified that a Hi<·hard 
F\:iern•y had a Utah State Drivers License' and that 
upon his departments record, lw was able to ddr>rn1i1H' 
that Hichard Feeney was the same iwrson as Harold 
Heemer. 
At no time after this point did the prosecution tie 
m the nanw Richard Feeney or, for that mattr>r, even 
rPfer to it. X or did the prosecution produce evidence of 
another transaction as proffered. Although thP jit<lge 
indicated that he would allow the testimony of the alias 
in evidence conditionally upon the prosecutions tying it 
in later, the court never did reconsider the materiality 
of that evidence. Appellant asserts that the testimony 
concr>rning the alias was irrelevant, immaterial, and d(•-
signed only to prejudice him in front of the jury. Inas-
much as the use of the alias could have no possible rele-
vancy or materiality to the issues involved in the prosP-
cutions case, the evidence could only have been offere<l 
to discredit Appellant's character. The record shows 
other examples of this type of irrelevant, prejudicial, 
character evidence. The record reveals the follmving 
testimony when the prosecution examined a police officer 
witness. 
Q. 18 it my understanding that sonw peo1>1<-
write th0se checks sort of not caring- ahont 
the results; was that what yon saicl'! 
A. Yes .... (R. 31) 
,, 
Q. And would you say that sornetirnes sorne of 
the things they might do might he a little 
A. Right. (R. 32) 
The prosecution's right to produce adverse char-
acter evidence, such as the use of an alias, is well out-
1 ined in the law and is very limited. Such evidence may 
only be introduced to rebut good character evidence or, 
in some circumstances, if it would tend to prove intent 
or knowledge of the crime charged. 29 Alvl Jur. 2d 389-
390 Evidence § 340 states: 
"The character of a person accused of a crime 
is not a fact in issue in a prosecution for such a 
crime, and the prosecution cannot, in its evidence 
in chief, for the purpose of inducing belief in the 
accused's guilt introduce evidence tending to show 
his bad character or reputation ... unless ... 
the accused first introduces evidence of good char-
acter or reputation. 
Utah follows this general rule. See State v. Hougen-
sen, 91 Utah 351 (citing State v. Thompson, 58 Utah 291, 
199 Pac. 161). In the Utah Hougensen case, Mr. Justice 
\V olf. in writing for the Court at page 365 Utah Reports, 
stated: 
"One can affect it by showing that the De-
fendant in a criminal case has a bad character as 
to a particular trait involved in the commission 
of thP crime, bnt only after evidence of the De-
fendant's good character has bePn received." 
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The courhl usually refuse to admit such C'haracter evi-
dence on grounds or relevancy or materiality, See e.g., 
State v. Gress, 250 Minn. 337, 84 N.W. 2d 616; State v. 
Garceau,, 122 Vt. 303, 170 Atl. 2d 623. However, the real 
rationale behind the rule is one of prejudice. See e.g., 
Topeca v. llarvey,188 Kan. 841, 365 P. 2d 1109 State 
V. Garceai1,, 122 Vt. 303, 170 Atl. 2d 623. vVhile use of 
an alias may be logically relevant or have some probative 
value to finding guilt, the prejudice from such evidence 
certainly outweighs the probative value. Such evidence 
is sometimes characterized as "bad man" evidence and 
the courts fear that a Defendant may be punished by a 
jnry for being a "bad man'' rather than because he was 
proven guilty of a specific crime. See 29 Am Jur 2d 
390, Evidence 340. 
The record shows in this case that after the prosecu-
tion had admitted evidence of Defendant's use of an 
alias, the Defendant then took the stand and explained 
why he had used an alias in applying for a drivers li-
cense. However, this does not clear the error of the 
prior alias evidence. See 29 AM Ji1,r 2d page 390, Evi-
dence 340 citing State v. Beckner, 194 Mo. sp 281, 91 
S.W. 892 which provides: 
C\V)here the accused has preyiously not sub-
mitted evidence of his good character, an error 
in admitting evidence on behalf of the prosecu-
tion as to the bad character of the actnsed is not 




When the state proferred the evidence of Defend-
ant's alias the prosecutor represented to the court that 
he would tie in Defendant's alias to the same or similar 
transaction. r:rhe court allowed the evidence conditionally 
on the prosecutors' later showing of materiality. The 
prosecution did not ever attempt to tie the alias into the 
transaction or offer any other reason for its materiality. 
could not possibly have been a material reason to 
show why the Defendant had used the name Richard 
Feeney in applying for a State Drivers License when 
the check in the present case was made out to the real 
name of the defendant Harold Reemer and all the per-
sons involved in the case had known the Defendant by 
the name of Harold Reemer. Therefore the only possible 
use for such evidence was to show questionable char-
acter on the part of the accused. This is clearly prejudi-
cial error in the law unless defendant had first offered 
of good character. Since defendant had not put his 
character in issue, the case should be reversed and re-
manded for a new trial. 
POINT TWO 
A VERDICT RENDERED BY A JURY OF SEVEN 
PERSONS IN A FELONY CASE IS INVALID. 
In the present case one of the jurors became ill dur-
ing the course of the trial. For some reason no alternate 
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juror was chosen. The Defense counsel stipulated that 
the case should be tried with seven jurors and the sick 
juror was excused. The verdict rendered was the unani-
mous verdict of seven jurors. 
The Utah Constitution requires that a jury consist 
of eight jurors. Art. 1 Sec. 10 provides : "A jury shall 
consist of eight jurors." The issue raised is whether the 
presence and verdict of one juror may be waived. There 
is no question that certain personal constitutional rights 
may be waived and that the right to a trial by jury is 
one of those rights. See Sec. 77-27-2 Utah Code Ann. 
(1953). There is also no question that certain constitu-
tional requirements cannot be waived. For example, par-
ties may not stipulate or agree to submit to the jurisdic-
tion of a court when the constitution does not impower 
the court to act. See v. United States, 219 U.S. 
346. 
Appellant argues that the constitutional requirement 
for eight jurors is that type of requirement that cannot 
be waived so as to allow a jury of seven in a felony case. 
The implications of the constitutional language that "a 
jury shall consist of jurors" is that seven jurors ·wonld 
not even be deemed a jury. Sec 78-46-5 Utah Code Ann. 
(1953) provides: 
A trial jury in capital cases shall consist of 
twelve jurors. A trial jury in other criminal 
and in civil cases in the District Courts shall con-
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sist of eight jurors; provided, that in civil cases 
ad cases of misdemeanors the jury may consist 
of any number less than eight upon which the 
parties may agree in open court .... 
Following familiar rules of statutory construction, 
the inclusion of allowing stipulation for less than eight 
jurors in civil cases and misdemeanor cases would im-
pliedly exclude a jury composed of a lesser number than 
eight in felony cases. 
Therefore, in light of the Utah Constitutional and 
statutory language the Appellant contends that there 
can be no less than eight jurors on a felony cases and 
to allow a verdict of seven jurors was error. 
The case should be reversed and remanded for a 
new trial. 
Respectfully submitted 
Richard J. Leedy 
263 South Second East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Appellant 
